FIA has updated its CCP Tracker visualizations with data from the fourth quarter.
The CCP Tracker visualizations show risk-related metrics for 15 clearinghouses side by side for each quarter going back to 2015. The metrics include initial margin, default funds, margin breaches, stress losses and concentration ratios. The data were obtained from the public quantitative disclosures published by the clearinghouses, which are generally released two or three months after the end of the quarter.
Highlights of the first quarter:
Initial margin functions as the first line of defense in case of a default. In the first quarter,
Taking the view down to the service level:
The default fund functions as a backstop in case a clearing member is unable to meet its obligations and its initial margin proves insufficient. Most default funds rely primarily from contributions from member firms, with some additional funding provided by the clearinghouse itself.
Many clearinghouses contribute their own funds, called "skin in the game", to an initial layer of protection that absorbs losses before the default fund is used.
The FIA CCP Tracker includes data on the largest margin breach over the prior 12 months. Margin breaches are measured at the member level, not the customer level, and represent the potential exposure to losses not covered by initial margin (i.e. where variation margin losses exceed the initial margin requirement for a particular member).
The largest margin breach over the 12 months ending in March was reported by LCH Ltd. That breach was £788.1 million ($995.7 million) in its clearing service for repos. LCH Ltd. also reported the second highest margin breach, £625.5 million ($790.2 million) in its interest rates clearing service. The third highest breach occurred at ICE Clear Europe in its clearing service for futures and options with $85.1 million at quarter-end.
CME had the lowest margin breach relative to other large CCPs. The peak margin breach reported in its first quarter disclosure was $558,426 for its "base" clearing service, which covers its exchange-traded futures and options. This was lower than the previous three quarters, meaning that this breach could have occurred anytime in the last year.
This section of the FIA CCP Tracker shows data on stress losses, which are defined as a CCP's estimate of the potential loss in case of a default by a single member and by two members at the same time.
FIA also calculates the ratio of the stress loss to the default fund as a way to gauge how much of the loss the surviving clearing members might have to absorb.
ICE's clearing services for credit default swaps had the lowest ratios of a single exposure to the default fund, just 0.1 for ICE Clear Credit in the US. ICE's futures and options clearing services also had relatively low ratios, 0.8 for ICE Clear Europe and 0.5 for ICE Clear US.
At the other end of the spectrum, the three clearing services operated by Hong Exchanges and Clearing -- SEOCH, OTC Clearing, and HKCC -- had ratios of 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 respectively. Seven of JSCC’s clearing services exhibited ratios greater than 1. In particular, the agriculture, the precious metals, and the rubber services had high ratios, with ratios of 3.1, 4.3, and 7.9 respectively.
This section of the FIA CCP Tracker includes data on the number of general clearing members at each clearinghouse. General clearing members, also known as futures commission merchants in the US, are those members that provide clearing for clients and affiliates. Some clearinghouses also have direct members that clear only their own positions.
The CCP Tracker also includes data on concentration ratios, i.e., the ratio of initial margin held by the top five members. The following table shows the IM concentration ratios during the first quarter for a sample set of CCPs.